Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor
署名单位:
University of Zurich; University of Copenhagen
刊物名称:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
1945-7669
DOI:
10.1257/mic.20190379
发表日期:
2022
页码:
506-560
关键词:
disclosure
reputation
signals
摘要:
Sellers often have the power to censor the reviews of their products. We explore the effect of these censorship policies in markets where some consumers are unaware of possible censorship. We find that if the share of such naive consumers is not too large, then rational consumers treat any bad review that is revealed in equilibrium as good news about product quality. This makes bad reviews worth revealing and allows the seller to use them to signal his product's quality to rational consumers.
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