Coordination and Organization Design: Theory and Micro-Evidences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dessein, Wouter; Lo, Desmond (Ho-Fu); Minami, Chieko
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Santa Clara University; Kobe University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200307
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 804-843
• 关键词: Vertical Integration; asset ownership; performance pay; DELEGATION; INFORMATION; incentives; authority; FIRMS; RISK; decentralization

摘要

We explore the relationship between the volatility of a firm's local environment and its organizational structure. Using micro-level data on managers working for a large retailer, we empirically test and provide support for our theory that a more volatile local environment results in more decentralization only when the need for coordination among subunits is low. In contrast, more local volatility is associated with more centralization when coordination needs are high. Our evi-dence supports the argument that centralized organizations are bet-ter at adapting to local shocks when coordination is important. (JEL D22, L23, L81, M11, M54)