Platform Governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Teh, Tat-How
• 署名单位: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190307
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 213-254
• 关键词: monopolistic competition; 2-sided markets; price; search; COORDINATION; INFORMATION; strategies; provision; QUALITY; variety

摘要

Platforms that intermediate trades-such as Amazon, Airbnb, and eBay-play a regulatory role in deciding how to govern the marketplaces they create. We propose a framework to analyze a platform's nonprice governance design and its incentive to act in a welfare-enhancing manner. We show that the platform's governance design can be distorted toward inducing insufficient or excessive seller competition, depending on the nature of the fee instrument employed by the platform. These results are illustrated with micro founded applications to a platform's control over seller entry, information provision and recommendations, quality standards, and search-design choices.