Investment and Information Acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Migrow, Dmitri; Severinov, Sergei
• 署名单位: University of Calgary; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200115
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 480-529
• 关键词: influence tactics; disclosure; COMMUNICATION; games

摘要

We study the interaction between productive investment and per-suasion activities in a principal???agent setting with strategic dis-closure. In an attempt to persuade the principal, the agent diverts substantial resources from productive activities to information acquisition for persuasion, even though productive activities are more efficient and raise the chances of success in persuasion. The equilibrium outcomes of simultaneous and sequential allocation procedures are the same, because the value of learning and exper-imentation through information acquisition is dominated by the value of productive investment. We show that an increase in cost of an investment project leads to a lower productive investment. (JEL D21, D82, D83, D86, G31)