American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

最新文章

• When Is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal? AI翻译
  作者：Evans, Robert; Reiche, Sonje
  作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; Yale University
  摘要：We compare contrarian to conformist advice, a contrarian expert being one whose preference bias is against the decision-maker's prior optimal decision. Optimality of an expert depends on char-acteristics of prior information and learning. If either the expert is fully informed or fine information can be acquired cheaply, then for symmetric distributions F of the state, a conformist (contrarian) is superior if F is single peaked (bimodal). If only coarse informa-tion can be acquired, then a con...
• Misbehavior in Common Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills AI翻译
  作者：Levin, Dan; Peck, James
  作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
  摘要：We characterize the optimal misbehavior by bidding rings or an auc-tioneer in the ascending English auction with common values. We also show, in an extended game, that in equilibrium potential members join and truthfully reveal their signals. Under a separability assump-tion, behavior does not change if nonring bidders are informed about the ring's existence. In general, misbehavior in dynamic settings is more profitable than in outcome-equivalent static settings. However, under a stronger sep...
• Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers AI翻译
  作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
  作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
  摘要：We study monopolistic screening when some consumers are data sensitive and incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals infor-mation to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates between data-sensitive and classical consumers using privacy mechanisms that consist of a direct mechanism and a privacy option. A privacy mechanism is optimal for large privacy costs and leaves classical consumers better off than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation. When privacy preferences become pu...
• Monitor Reputation and Transparency AI翻译
  作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Szydlowsii, Martin
  作者单位：Stanford University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
  摘要：We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor's reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that...
• Working for References AI翻译
  作者：Hafner, Samuel; Taylor, Curtis R.
  作者单位：University of St Gallen; Duke University
  摘要：We analyze the incentive and welfare consequences of job references in a large economy marked by moral hazard, limited liability, exogenous job separation, and structural unemployment. In the firm-optimal equilibrium, employers provide references whenever production is successful, and workers holding references are hired with certainty in the ensuing period. Compared to a setting without references: the bonus-contract offers are lower, yet the workers' equilibrium effort is higher. Profits and...
• Too Good to Be True? Retention Rules for Noisy Agents AI翻译
  作者：Espinosa, Francisco; Ray, Debra
  作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University; University of Warwick
  摘要：An agent who privately knows his type seeks to be retained by a principal. Agents signal their type with some ambient noise, but can alter this noise, perhaps at some cost. Our main finding is that in equilibrium, the principal treats extreme signals in either direction with suspicion, and retains the agent if and only if the signal falls in some intermediate bounded set. In short, she follows the maxim: if it seems too good to be true, it probably is. We consider exten-sions and applications,...
• Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actionst AI翻译
  作者：Ke, T. Tony; Li, Christopher; Safronov, Mikhail
  作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Vanderbilt University; University of Cambridge
  摘要：This paper explores potential inefficiencies of incomplete contracts in a dynamic career concerns context. In a firm-worker relationship, the worker performs public tasks that have trade-offs between pro-ductivity and informativeness. We show that the first-best outcome can be obtained with short-term contracts if the wage can depend on the task choice. This provides an explanation for wage jumps at promotions-the worker is assigned the more productive but less informative task after promotion...
• Alert the Inert? Switching Costs and Limited Awareness in Retail Electricity Marketst AI翻译
  作者：Dressler, Luisa; Weiergraeber, Stefan
  作者单位：Solvay SA; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
  摘要：We quantify how switching costs and limited awareness affect con-sumer inertia in liberalized retail electricity markets by developing and estimating a structural demand model using a novel dataset on electricity contract choices in Belgium. Our data allow us to dis-entangle different sources of inertia by using a rich combination of macromoments and micromoments. We find that consumers perceive contracts as differentiated and both limited awareness and switching costs hinder efficient choices...
• Implications of Unequal Discounting in Dynamic Contracting AI翻译
  作者：Krasikov, Ilia; Lamba, Rohit; Mettral, Thomas
  作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
  摘要：This paper studies a canonical dynamic screening problem where the agent has Markovian private information and limited commit-ment and the principal and the agent have different discount fac-tors. Unequal discounting captures unequal access to capital markets. In comparison to standard models of dynamic mecha-nism design, the principal no longer finds it optimal to maximally back-load the agent's information rents: a new force of inter -temporal cost of incentive provision pushes toward front ...
• The Doors of Perception: Theory and Evidence of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability† AI翻译
  作者：Charness, Gary; Sontuoso, Alessandro
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Pennsylvania
  摘要：We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about the game. In our games the action set consists of visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match the counterpart's choice. We propose a model where different player-types are aware of different attributes of the action set (hence, different frames). One of the novelties is an epistemic structure that allows players to think about new frames, after initial unawarenes...