Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cheng, Ing-Haw; Hsiaw, Alice
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Brandeis University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200218
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 761-803
• 关键词: communication; Harassment; equilibrium; INFORMATION; MODEL; RISK

摘要

We model the reporting of sexual misconduct. Individuals underreport misconduct due to strategic uncertainty over whether others will report and corroborate a pattern of behavior. Underreporting occurs if and only if misconduct is widespread. Making sanctions more responsive to reports, raising public awareness of misconduct, implementing con-fidential holding tanks, and appropriately calibrating damage awards can encourage reporting. However, we also show when such policies are ineffective or backfire. Managers may avoid mentoring subordi-nates, spilling over into reporting. A holding tank may discourage reporting by raising the bar to access reports. Overall, we highlight several unintended and intended consequences of #MeToo.