Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Xueheng
• 署名单位: Sun Yat Sen University; Sun Yat Sen University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.009
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: conformist transmission; cultural transmission; STRONG RECIPROCITY; Local interaction; social norms; ENFORCEMENT; DYNAMICS; games; PUNISHMENT; CONTRACTS

摘要

Sociologists and psychologists have long argued that emotions are essential to sustaining social norms. This study examines the role of indignation in upholding cooperation norms within society. I model indignation in a population psychological game and characterize the stochastically stable equilibrium in a noisy best-reply dynamic. The analysis yields two findings. First, indignation can sustain cooperation in the long run, irrespective of whether interactions are global or occur within a fixed local interaction structure. Second, mobility allows individuals to sort into cooperative communities, causing these communities to grow in size and persist under a wider range of conditions. Therefore, mobility fosters stable norms of cooperation and punishment in large human societies. This study is the first to apply stochastic stability to address multiple equilibria in psychological games.