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作者：Amir, Rabah; Harrison, Rodrigo; Jara-Moroni, Pedro
作者单位：University of Iowa; Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; Universidad de Santiago de Chile
摘要：We propose a global games approach to the standard two-stage entry game. The entry decisions in the first stage are strategic substitutes. The second-stage game of product market competition reflects a fundamental common value market attractiveness parameter, about which firms get private noisy signals. The main result establishes the selection of a unique equilibrium in the entry game, as noise vanishes, in cut-off strategies implying efficient entry. This provides a theoretical foundation fo...
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作者：Athanasoglou, Stergios; Bonkoungou, Somouaoga
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：We consider a group of voters that needs to decide between two candidates. In this setting, Mwinning coalition rules are characterized by neutrality and strategy-proofness (Moulin, 1983). Their practical implementation motivates the introduction of sequential unanimity rules. We develop algorithms that transform a given M-winning coalition rule into an equivalent sequential unanimity rule and vice versa. The sequential unanimity rules that are constructed present computational advantages compa...
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作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.; Brown, Alexander L.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper introduces a refinement of Nash equilibrium (NE) to determine the relevance of weakly dominated NE in games. We adapt Harsanyi (1973)'s concept of approachability, originally based on games with randomly disturbed payoffs, and extend it to a broader family that encompasses the most widely used equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior. We identify a singular NE refinement, approximate payoff monotone equilibrium (APME), that coincides with the set of NE that are approachab...
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作者：Gui, Shan; Houser, Daniel
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study dynamic mechanism design in non-clairvoyant environments, where sellers cannot forecast future demand and buyers hold private information. Using two laboratory experiments, we evaluate two non-clairvoyant mechanisms: the dynamic maximin-optimal non-clairvoyant mechanism (DM, Mirrokni et al., 2020) and the repeated static optimal mechanism (RS, Myerson, 1981). Experiment 1 compares DM and RS between demand-distribution scenarios and shows that non-clairvoyant mechanisms perform as inte...
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作者：Bravard, Christophe; Chaudhuri, Promit K.; Sarangi, Sudipta; Tzavellas, Hector
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; INRAE; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：Networks frequently experience attrition as individual members exit over time. Such departures can significantly impact the behavior of their peers and have cascading effects on overall network activity. We investigate such effects within the framework of the canonical linear-quadratic model of peer influence. We introduce an exogenous shock that removes certain agents from the network, with the key feature that only their immediate neighbors observe these departures. In this setting of incomp...
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作者：Bredereck, Robert; Chen, Jiehua; Knop, Dusan; Luo, Junjie; Niedermeier, Rolf
作者单位：TU Clausthal; Technische Universitat Wien; Czech Technical University Prague; Beijing Jiaotong University; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this principle by proposing incrementalized versions of STABLE MARRIAGE and STA-BLE ROOMMATES, asking what the computational cost is of adapting an existing stable matching after agents' preferences have changed. We additionally require that the new stable matching should not deviate too much from the old one. After formalizing these incremental versions, we provide a comprehensive computational...
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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Koh, Youngwoo; Baik, Sosung
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders are ambiguity averse and follow the max-min expected utility model. Each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs that are close to the seller's belief, where closeness is defined by a divergence. For a given allocation rule, we show that optimal transfers belong to a specific class of transfers, termed win-lose dependent transfers, in which bidders' transfers upon winning and losing depend only on their own types but not on their oppo...
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作者：Cartea, Alvaro; Chang, Patrick; Penalva, Jose; Waldon, Harrison
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We prove a Folk theorem when players with bounded rationality learn as they play a repeated potential game. We use a dynamic generalization of smooth fictitious play with bounded m-recall strategies to model learning with bounded rationality that is consistent with learning by algorithms. In a repeated potential game with perfect monitoring, we use this learning model to show that for any feasible and individually rational payoff profile, if players have sufficient recall, are sufficiently pat...
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作者：Atay, Ata; Nunez, Marina; Solymosi, Tamas
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：This paper analyzes the extent to which well-known results on the relationship between the bargaining set, the core, and the kernel in one-to-one assignment games generalize to many-to-one assignment markets, and by extension, many-to-many markets. Using a minimal counterexample, we show that the bargaining set does not necessarily coincide with the core and that the kernel may not be contained within the core. We would like to highlight that the failure of the coincidence between the core and...
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作者：Merlino, Luca P.; Tabasso, Nicole
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (misinformation) when agents are biased and able to verify messages. As a recipient of a false message who verifies it becomes informed of the truth, a higher prevalence of misinformation can increase the prevalence of the truth. We uncover conditions such that this happens and discuss policy implications. Specifically, a planner aiming to maximize the prevalence of the truth should allow misinformation to circulate if: non-verified messages...
