Disclosure-proof correlated equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Saas, Scott
• 署名单位: University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.08.001
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: play

摘要

This paper explores which correlated equilibrium outcomes are robust to players having the option to publicly and verifiably disclose their private information before playing the game. I focus on outcomes that are disclosure-proof: those that can be induced such that no player is incentivized to disclose their signal. Since signals in this environment do not carry payoff-relevant information, disclosing only limits the ability to coordinate agents off-path. I show that an outcome is disclosure-proof if and only if it satisfies obedience and certain interim participation constraints. Each player must expect to earn more after observing any of their signals than they would in the worst correlated equilibria outcome where they play independently of the other players. For two-player games, this is equivalent to the payoff of their worst Nash outcome. When players can disclose over multiple rounds, all implementable outcomes will be disclosure-proof.