Success functions in large contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Azrieli, Yaron; Chambers, Christopher P.
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.004
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Rent-seeking

摘要

We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by the designer's budget constraint. Any such Random Performance Function (RPF) satisfies a Co-monotonicity property, which implies that opponents' effort distributions can be unambiguously ranked based on how competitive they are. We prove that Co-monotonicity, along with standard continuity and mono-tonicity properties, in fact characterize the class of RPFs. We also describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the noise term to have an additive structure. The idea of a continuum of traders may seem outlandish to the reader. Actually, it is no stranger than a continuum of prices or of strategies or a continuum of 'particles' in fluid mechanics... It should be emphasized that our consideration of a continuum of traders is not merely a mathematical exercise; it is the expression of an economic idea. In: Markets with a continuum of traders, Robert J. Aumann, Econometrica 1964