-
作者：Cardona, Daniel; Ponsati, Clara
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Universitat de les Illes Balears; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterizati...
-
作者：Eguia, Jon X.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blo...
-
作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.; Maasland, Emiel
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Vienna; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. In this note, we argue that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make. These payments, so-called flexible entry fees, do not affect the allocation decisi...
-
作者：Bag, Parimal Kanti; Saha, Bibhas
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of East Anglia
摘要：Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the 'lemons' (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits bu...
-
作者：Lippert, Steffen; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
作者单位：Massey University; University of Auckland; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study networks of relations - groups of agents linked by several cooperative relationships - exploring equilibrium conditions under different network configurations and information structures. Relationships are the links through which soft information can flow, and the value of a network lies in its ability to enforce agreements that could not be sustained without the information and sanctioning power provided by other network members. The model explains why network closure is important; wh...
-
作者：Schmutzler, Armin
摘要：The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative sta...
-
作者：Masso, Jordi; de Barreda, Ines Moreno
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strateg...
-
作者：Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Barbera, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad de Malaga; Universidad de Malaga
摘要：When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the voters' most preferred alternatives. This important fact is known as the median voter result. Variants of it also apply when single-peakedness fails, but preferences verify other domain restrictions, such as single-crossing, intermediateness or order restriction. Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) also proved that t...
-
作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that direction benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that ...
