-
作者：Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.; Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a finite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sufficient condition under which the join-semilattice reduc...
-
作者：de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：In this paper, I study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework. Agent overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an optimistic or overconfident agent disproportionately values success-contingent payments, and thus prefers higher-powered incentives. On the other hand, if the agent overestimates the extent to which his actions affect outcomes, lower-powered incentives are sufficient to induce any given effort...
-
作者：Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the bidders' incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskin's (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Cubitt, Robin P.; Sugden, Robert
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia
摘要：This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite non-cooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding the conceptual problems associated with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. It uses a sequence of accumulation and deletion operations to categorise strategies as permissible and impermi...
-
作者：Granot, Daniel; Hamers, Herbert; Kuipers, Jeroen; Maschler, Michael
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：We study the extended Chinese postman (CP) cooperative game induced by a connected, weighted, undirected graph G. wherein a postman, starting from a post office location, needs to traverse all edges wherein players reside, before returning to the post-office. We characterize the graphs associated with all CP games in which the players on a road pay exactly the cost of the road at each core point, regardless of the number of players residing on the road, the location of the post-office and the ...
-
作者：Mitra, Manipushpak; Mutuswami, Suresh
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; University of Leicester
摘要：We identify and characterize a natural and intuitive class of mechanisms called the k-pivotal mechanisms. The axioms used are efficiency, pairwise strategyproofness, equal treatment of equals and weak linearity. We also identify the subclass of these mechanisms which do not run a budget deficit at all profiles and the mechanism which runs the least budget surplus. We also show that while k-pivotal mechanisms are also weak group strategyproof, strong group strategyproofness and efficiency are i...
-
作者：Stein, Noah D.; Parrilo, Pablo A.; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of departure functions. We use these characterizations to construct effective algorithms for approximating a single correlated equilibrium or the entire set of correlated equilibria of a game with polynomial utility functions. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Izmalkov, Sergei; Lepinski, Matt; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); RTX Corporation; Raytheon BBN Technologies; New Economic School
摘要：Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator may fail to reach the mechanism's objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type. We put forward the notion of a perfect implementation of a normal-form mechanism M: in essence, a concrete extensive-form mechanism...
-
作者：Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe; Rutter, Tom
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment in which subjects sometimes only have access to the aggregate distribution of play of the opponents over the various games and sometimes are told the joint distribution of actions and games in a more or less accessible way. Our main findings are: 1) In the presence of feedback spillover, long run behaviors stabilize to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005). 2) Faced with the same objective feedback, the long run behavi...
-
作者：Jiang, Albert Xin; Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Bhat, Navin A. R.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Toronto
摘要：Representing and reasoning with games becomes difficult once they involve large numbers of actions and players, because the space requirement for utility functions can grow unmanageably. Action-Graph Games (AGGs) are a fully-expressive game representation that can compactly express utility functions with structure such as context-specific independence, anonymity, and additivity. We show that AGGs can be used to compactly represent all games that are compact when represented as graphical games,...
