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作者：Okada, Akira
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient. (C) 2...
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作者：Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that subjects will choose the payoff dominated game (representing a bad explicit contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity consider...
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作者：Hellman, Ziv
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Extending to infinite state spaces that are compact metric spaces a result previously attained by D. Samet solely in the context of finite state spaces, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players' present beliefs only. A common prior exists if and only if for each random variable it is common knowledge that all Cesaro means of iterated expectations with respect to any permutation converge to the same value; this...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Stockholm University; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：The aim of this paper is to provide a tractable model where both socialization (or network formation) and productive efforts can be analyzed simultaneously. This permits a full-fledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous productive efforts and heterogeneous agents. We show that there exist two stable interior equilibria, which we can Pareto rank. The socially efficient outcome lies between these two equilibria. When the intrinsic returns to production and socializ...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
摘要：The non-existence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter re...
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作者：Staudigl, Mathias
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：This paper studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the context of finite population potential games. Action revision, link creation and link destruction are combined in a continuous-time Markov process. I derive the unique invariant distribution of this process in closed Form, as well as the marginal distribution over action profiles and the conditional distribution over networks. It is shown that the equilibrium interaction topology is an inhomogeneous random graph. Furthermore, a ch...
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作者：Carceles-Poveda, Eva; Tauman, Yair
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Reichman University
摘要：We study a two stage game in which a transnational terrorist organization interacts with an arbitrary number of countries that may differ in their political or economic power, their military effectiveness, the benefit from cooperating against terrorism and the value they assign to damage. Only a subset of countries that emerges endogenously takes proactive measures to fight the terrorist, while all countries incur defensive expenditures to protect their soil. We characterize analytically the p...
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作者：Casella, Alessandra
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The paper studies a committee voting sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. Each member is granted, in addition to a vote for each proposal, a single extra bonus vote - a streamlined version of Storable Votes. When the order of the agenda is exogenous, a sufficient condition guarantees the existence of welfare gains, relative to simple majority voting. But is efficiency compromised if a chair controls the order of the agenda? The agenda becomes cheap talk and can be used to transm...
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作者：Cooper, David J.; Rege, Mari
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Universitetet i Stavanger
摘要：Extensive field evidence shows individuals decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers' decisions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual's utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes of peer effects in choice under uncertainty. We find strong peer group effects in the laboratory. Our design allows us to rule out social le...
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作者：Shahriar, Quazi; Wooders, John
作者单位：University of Arizona; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：eBay's Buy It Now format allows a seller to list an auction with a buy price at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately and end the auction. When bidders are risk averse, then theoretically a buy price can raise seller revenue when values are private (but not when values are common). We report the results of laboratory experiments designed to determine whether in practice a buy price is advantageous to the seller. We find that a suitably chosen buy price yields a substantial increase ...
