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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：In the dynamic game we analyze, players are the members of a fixed network. Everyone is initially endowed with an information item that he is the only player to hold. Players are offered a finite number of periods to centralize the initially dispersed items in the hands of any one member of the network. In every period, each agent strategically chooses whether or not to transmit the items he holds to his neighbors in the network. The sooner all the items are gathered by any individual, the bet...
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作者：Bulo, Samuel Rota; Bomze, Immanuel M.
作者单位：University of Vienna; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：Building upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier, we propose the new Infection and Immunization Dynamics (INFIMMDYN), modelling a plausible adaptation process in a large population. For general games, this yields a novel refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept based on dynamical arguments, close in spirit to Nash's original mass action idea in his Ph.D. thesis. For partnership games, INFIMMDYN exhibits a better asymptotic behavior compared to other p...
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作者：Comino, Stefano; Manenti, Fabio M.; Nicolo, Antonio
作者单位：University of Udine; University of Padua
摘要：The theoretical literature on the cumulative innovation process has emphasized the role of ex-ante licensing - namely, licensing agreements negotiated before the follow-on innovator has sunk its R&D investment - in mitigating the risk of hold-up of future innovations. In this paper, we consider a patent-holder and a follow-on innovator bargaining over the licensing terms in a context where the former firm is unable to observe the timing of the R&D investment of the latter. We show that the pos...
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作者：Walker, Mark; Wooders, John; Amir, Rabah
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：We study two-person extensive form games, or matches, in which the only possible outcomes (if the game terminates) are that one player or the other is declared the winner. The winner of the match is determined by the winning of points, in point games. We call these matches binary Markov games. We show that if a simple monotonicity condition is satisfied, then (a) it is a Nash equilibrium of the match for the players, at each point, to play a Nash equilibrium of the point game; (b) it is a mini...
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作者：Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southern California
摘要：We investigate a common value bilateral bargaining model with two-sided private information and no aggregate uncertainty. A seller owns an asset whose common valuation is a deterministic function of the two traders' private signals. We first establish a notrade theorem for this environment, and proceed to study the effect of the asset valuation structure and the trading mechanism on extent to which asymmetric information induces individuals to engage in mutually unprofitable exchange. A labora...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：New York University; Brown University
摘要：Framing effects have a significant influence on the finitely repeated matching pennies game. The combination of being labelled a guesser, and having the objective of matching the opponent's action, appears to be advantageous. We find that being a player who aims to match the opponent's action is advantageous irrespective of whether the player moves first or second. We examine alternative explanations for our results and relate them to Edgar Allan Poe's The Purloined Letter. We propose a behavi...
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作者：Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo; Ponti, Giovanni; Tomas, Josefa; Ubeda, Luis
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：This paper studies, both theoretically and experimentally, framing effects in the context of a public good game in which players have to make a costly contribution either (i) to achieve or (ii) not to lose a non-excludable monetary prize. Our protocol leads to public good provision (not deterioration) only if a certain contribution level is achieved. Since both frames differ with respect to the reference point, we apply Prospect Theory to derive testable predictions. In particular, Prospect Th...
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作者：Moulin, Herve; Laigret, Francois
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：We propose a simple division of the costs of non-rival resources, when a user's need can be met by different subsets of the resources, and no resource is redundant. Our method is characterized by the Stand Alone core property, additivity in costs, and a symmetry requirement. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players n, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every n-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient condition that a dynamics has to satisfy in order for it to have property (W). The key determinant is found to be the sensitivity of the learning-rate to small payoff differences, inherent in the dynamics. If...
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作者：Young, H. Peyton
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：John Nash's work laid the foundations for evolutionary game theory as well as the theory of games with rational agents. The Nash bargaining solution emerges as a natural solution concept in both of these settings. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
