-
作者：Aggarwal, Gagan; Fiat, Amos; Goldberg, Andrew V.; Hartline, Jason D.; Immorlica, Nicole; Sudan, Madhu
作者单位：Northwestern University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Tel Aviv University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the role of randomization in seller optimal (i.e., profit maximization) auctions. Bayesian optimal auctions (e.g., Myerson, 1981) assume that the valuations of the agents are random draws from a distribution and prior-free optimal auctions either are randomized (e.g.. Goldberg et al., 2006) or assume the valuations are randomized (e.g., Segal, 2003). Is randomization fundamental to profit maximization in auctions? Our main result is a general approach to derandomize single-item multi-...
-
作者：Jaeger, Gerhard; Metzger, Lars P.; Riedel, Frank
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game as Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in th...
-
作者：Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We study how aggregate effort exerted in contests between groups of heterogeneous players depends on the sorting of players into groups. We show that the optimal sorting depends on the curvature of the effort cost function. From the perspective of a contest organizer whose objective is to maximize aggregate effort, it is optimal to sort players in a way that minimizes the variation in ability across groups if the effort cost function is moderately steep. However, for a sufficiently steep effor...
-
作者：Georganas, Sotiris
作者单位：University of London; University of Bonn
摘要：I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in English auctions. Subjects tend to overbid, when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus ...
-
作者：Laurent-Lucchetti, Jeremy; Leroux, Justin
作者单位：University of Bern; University of Bern; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic. In practice revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to select It efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) while simultaneously allowing for the in plementation of any individually rational division of the w...
-
作者：Guarino, Antonio; Harmgart, Heike; Huck, Steffen
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; European Bank of Reconstructon & Development
摘要：We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of casc...
-
作者：Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Normann, Hans Theo
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Universidad del Rosario; University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Max Planck Society
摘要：We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences inequality aversion using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at...
-
作者：Fiedler, Marina; Haruvy, Ernan; Li, Sherry Xin
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Passau
摘要：We conduct a quasi-field experiment in a virtual world environment to investigate the impact of social distance on economic choices. We design trust games with partner selection, in which the proposer chooses between a familiar responder and a stranger with a higher multiplier. When choosing between the two responders, the proposer faces tradeoffs between economic opportunities and social distance. Comparing participants' behaviors to those in a standalone trust game, we find that in the virtu...
-
作者：Sano, Ryuji
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper considers some package auctions with known single-minded bidders. A single-minded bidder is interested in a unique bundle of goods and bids only for that bundle. We examine each bidder's incentive in Ausubel and Milgrom's (2002) ascending proxy auction and every bidder-optimal core-selecting auction. We provide a simple condition for each bidder to report his valuation truthfully, which can be expressed in a single sentence any rival of my rivals is my rival. The Vickrey outcome lie...
-
作者：Ivanov, Asen
作者单位：Virginia Commonwealth University
摘要：Based on an experiment in the lab, we classify behavior in one-shot normal-form games along three important dimensions. The first dimension, which is of main interest, is about whether subjects are ambiguity-loving, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-averse. The second dimension is about whether subjects are risk-loving, risk-neutral, or risk-averse. The third dimension is about whether subjects are naive or strategic. Our main result is that, in our main treatment, 32/46/22 percent of subjects a...
