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作者：Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Huck, Steffen; Weizsaecker, Georg
作者单位：University of St Andrews; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's belief about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments asks participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and actions. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by informing the agent about exogenous manipulations of the relevant events. We conduct t...
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作者：Routledge, R. R.
摘要：The study of coalition formation under uncertainty poses subtle questions regarding the appropriate definition of the core. In this paper a new core concept, the interim sequential core (ISC), is proposed as a solution concept to transferable utility games with uncertainty when binding agreements cannot be written. This solution concept remedies a problem with the weak sequential core (WSC) of Habis and Herings (2011) but avoids the myopia implicit in the strong sequential core (SSC). The thre...
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作者：Miura, Shintaro
作者单位：Kanagawa University
摘要：This paper studies a two-dimensional cheap talk game with two senders and one receiver. The senders possess the same information and sequentially send messages about that information. In one-dimensional sequential message cheap talk games where the state space is unbounded, the information is fully transmitted under the self-serving belief, as suggested by Krishna and Morgan (2001b). However, this result depends crucially on the structure of the one-dimensional model. It generally does not hol...
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作者：Becchetti, Leonardo; Fiaschetti, Maurizio; Marini, Giancarlo
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata
摘要：We wonder whether different game experiences are associated with significant differences in experimental behavior and, more specifically, whether expert bridge players, due to their habit of playing with partners and seldom for money, are more likely to adopt cooperative behavior than expert poker players. Evidence from trust games shows that bridge players make more polarized choices and choose the maximum trustor contribution significantly more often. Our findings are similar across incentiv...
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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield mutual benefits but only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by ex ante committing to the quality of his information, and the disclosure rule. We show that even when the acquisition of perfect information is costless, the principal may optimally acquire imperfect informat...
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作者：Bozbay, Irem; Dietrich, Franz; Peters, Hans
作者单位：University of Surrey; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of East Anglia; Maastricht University
摘要：We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation probl...
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作者：Maestri, Lucas
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study a repeated principal agent model with subjective evaluations. We construct simple bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes. In these schemes, the principal evaluates the agent every T periods. The principal pays a bonus and asks the agent to work for T more periods if the evaluation is positive. The relationship is terminated if the evaluation is negative. The inefficiencies in these schemes vanish as the agent can be more frequently evaluated. This result holds generally under objective ...
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作者：Monte, Daniel
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study learning with bounded memory in zero-sum repeated games with one-sided incomplete information. The uninformed player has only a fixed number of memory states available. His strategy is to choose a transition rule from state to state, and an action rule, which is a map from each memory state to the set of actions. We show that the equilibrium transition rule involves randomization only in the intermediate memory states. Such randomization, or less frequent updating, is interpreted as a...
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice function...
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作者：Bach, Christian W.; Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All...
