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作者：de Weerdt, Mathijs M.; Harrenstein, Paul; Conitzer, Vincent
作者单位：Delft University of Technology; University of Oxford; Duke University
摘要：A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non-winning players. When each bidder can always offer a contract with higher utility for the center at an arbitrarily small loss of her own utility, the QVA i...
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作者：Dominguez-Martinez, Silvia; Sloof, Randolph; von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Goethe University Frankfurt; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the predictio...
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作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：A leading solution concept in the evolutionary study of extensive-form games is Selten (1983) notion of limit ESS. This note demonstrates that a limit ESS does not imply neutral stability, and that it may be dynamically unstable (almost any small perturbation takes the population away). These problems arise due to an implicit assumption that mutants are arbitrarily rare relative to trembling incumbents. Finally, I present a novel definition that solves this issue and has appealing properties. ...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey; Holmes, Jessica; Matthews, Peter Hans
作者单位：Middlebury College; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Donations in-kind can be a mixed blessing for charities, who are often more adept at solicitation than resale. Many organizations rely on raffles to turn donations into cash, but auctions are also common. Theory predicts that all-pay mechanisms should produce more revenue than winner-pay mechanisms, but the empirical literature is thin and inconclusive. Drawing on both theoretical insights and behavioral intuition, we examine another all-pay mechanism, the bucket auction, and show that it gene...
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作者：Bando, Keisuke
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：This study analyzes a preference revelation game in the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem. We assume that each college's true preferences are known publicly, and analyze the strategic behavior of students. We demonstrate the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium in the preference revelation game through a simple algorithm that finds it. Specifically, (i) the equilibrium outcome from our algorithm is the same matching as in the efficiency-adj...
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作者：Sakovics, Jozsef
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：We model a market where the surpluses from seller buyer matches are heterogeneous but common knowledge. Price setting is synchronous with search: buyers simultaneously make one personalized offer each to the seller of their choice. With impatient players efficient coordination is not possible, and both temporary and permanent mismatches occur. Nonetheless, for patient players efficient matching (with monopsony wages) is an equilibrium. The setting is inspired by a labor market for highly skill...
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作者：Gomes, Renato; Sweeney, Kane
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We develop a Bayes-Nash analysis of the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, the multi-unit auction used by search engines to sell sponsored advertising positions. Our main result characterizes the efficient Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the GSP and provides a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees existence of such an equilibrium. With only two positions, this condition requires that the click-through rate of the second position is sufficiently smaller than that of the first. When ...
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作者：Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：In this paper, we introduce a notion of epistemic equivalence between hierarchies of conditional beliefs and hierarchies of lexicographic beliefs, thus extending the standard equivalence results of Halpern (2010) and Brandenburger et al. (2007) to an interactive setting, and we show that there is a Borel surjective function, mapping each conditional belief hierarchy to its epistemically equivalent lexicographic belief hierarchy. Then, using our equivalence result we construct a terminal type s...
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作者：Regner, Tobias
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：We analyse pricing, effort and tipping decisions at the online service 'Google Answers'. Users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, and they can additionally tip the researcher who provided the answer ex post. A positive wage-effort relationship is frequently found in laboratory gift-exchange games, yet field evidence for reciprocity in two-stage settings (wage, effort) is mixed. Our field data confirms lab findings for the three-stage design (wage, effort, bonus). Tipping is ...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Oregon
摘要：This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The projection rule is the only rule satisfying subset consistency and responsiveness to the original partition of non-deviating players. It is also the only rule satisfying subset consistency, independence of the original partition of deviating players, and coherence of expectations. Exogenous rules are the only rules sa...
