Random dictatorship domains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.017
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 212-236
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; Random social choice functions; random dictatorship

摘要

A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in Aswal et al., 2003) are needed to restore random dictatorship and such strengthenings are almost necessary. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.