Multidimensional cheap talk with sequential messages

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miura, Shintaro
• 署名单位: Kanagawa University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 419-441
• 关键词: multidimensional cheap talk; Multi-senders; Sequential communication; Fully revealing equilibrium

摘要

This paper studies a two-dimensional cheap talk game with two senders and one receiver. The senders possess the same information and sequentially send messages about that information. In one-dimensional sequential message cheap talk games where the state space is unbounded, the information is fully transmitted under the self-serving belief, as suggested by Krishna and Morgan (2001b). However, this result depends crucially on the structure of the one-dimensional model. It generally does not hold in two-dimensional models. We consider the extended self-serving belief, which implies full information transmission even if the self-serving belief cannot work. Then, we show that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the fully revealing equilibrium is that the senders have opposing-biased preferences. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.