Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bozbay, Irem; Dietrich, Franz; Peters, Hans
• 署名单位: University of Surrey; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of East Anglia; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.007
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 571-590
• 关键词: Judgment aggregation; private information; Efficient information aggregation; strategic voting

摘要

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of 'yes' votes exceeds a particular quota. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.