-
作者：Grant, Simon; Kline, J. Jude; Quiggin, John
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：We consider the optimality of liquidated damages contracts in a setting of contractual ambiguity and potential for disputes. We show that when parties are ambiguity averse enough, they will optimally choose liquidated damages contracts and sacrifice risk sharing opportunities. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
-
作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.
摘要：This paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive two-sided matching market. Firms and workers may have heterogeneous preferences over matches on the other side, and the model allows for both uniform and personalized wages or contracts. To make the model tractable, I use the Azevedo and Leshno (2013) framework, in which a finite number of firms is matched to a continuum of workers. In equilibrium, even if wages are exogenous and fixed, firms have incentives to strat...
-
作者：Aramendia, Miguel; Wen, Quan
作者单位：University of Basque Country; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：In repeated games, subgame perfection requires all continuation strategy profiles must be effective to enforce the equilibrium; they serve as punishments should deviations occur. It does not require whether a punishment can be justified for the deviation, which creates a great deal of freedom in constructing equilibrium strategies, resulting the well-known folk theorem. We introduce justifiable punishments in repeated games. After one player deviates, the corresponding continuation or punishme...
-
作者：Hu, Tai-Wei
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Unpredictable behavior is central to optimal play in many strategic situations because predictable patterns leave players vulnerable to exploitation. A theory of unpredictable behavior based on differential complexity constraints is presented in the context of repeated two-person zero-sum games. Each player's complexity constraint is represented by an endowed oracle and a strategy is feasible if it can be implemented with an oracle machine using that oracle. When one player's oracle is suffici...
-
作者：Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Potential manipulation of prices and convergence to rational expectations equilibrium is studied in a game without noise traders. Informed players with initially long and short positions (bulls and bears) seek to manipulate consumer expectations in opposite directions. In equilibrium, period 1 prices reveal the state, so manipulation is unsuccessful. Bears and uninformed consumers sell up to their short-sale limits in period 1. Bulls buy in period 1 but receive arbitrage losses. When the numbe...
-
作者：Gayer, Gabrielle; Gilboa, Itzhak
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider the dynamics of reasoning by general rules (theories) and by specific cases (analogies). When an agent faces an exogenous process, we show that, under mild conditions, if reality happens to be simple, the agent will converge to adopt a theory and discard analogical thinking. If, however, reality is complex, analogical reasoning is unlikely to disappear. By contrast, when the agent is a player in a large population coordination game, and the process is generated by all players' pred...
-
作者：Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier; Holden, Richard
作者单位：Columbia University; Paris School of Economics; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Southern Denmark
摘要：We consider the problem of assigning agents to slots on a line, where only one agent can be served at a slot and each agent prefers to be served as close as possible to his target. Our focus is on aggregate gap minimizing methods, i.e., those that minimize the total gap between targets and assigned slots. We first consider deterministic assignment of agents to slots, and provide a direct method for testing if a given deterministic assignment is aggregate gap minimizing. We then consider probab...
-
作者：Hugh-Jones, David; Kurino, Morimitsu; Vanberg, Christoph
作者单位：University of Essex; University of Tsukuba; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. However, the mechanism is not strategy-proof, so participants may not truthfully report their preferences. We investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the PS mechanism. We ...
-
作者：Lin, Wanchuan; Liu, Yiming; Meng, Juanjuan
作者单位：Peking University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper investigates the crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk-sharing arrangements via theory and laboratory experiment. Our model and simulation predict that the crowding out of private transfers is often more than one-for-one and will reduce the total risk coverage. Furthermore, the existence of a moderate degree of altruism exaggerates the crowding-out effect, especially when there is an ex-ante income inequality. These predictions are mostly supported by the laborato...
