Learning with bounded memory in games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Monte, Daniel
• 署名单位: Getulio Vargas Foundation
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 204-223
• 关键词: Bounded memory; Incomplete information games; repeated games

摘要

We study learning with bounded memory in zero-sum repeated games with one-sided incomplete information. The uninformed player has only a fixed number of memory states available. His strategy is to choose a transition rule from state to state, and an action rule, which is a map from each memory state to the set of actions. We show that the equilibrium transition rule involves randomization only in the intermediate memory states. Such randomization, or less frequent updating, is interpreted as a way of testing the opponent, which generates inertia in the player's behavior and is the main short-run bias in information processing exhibited by the bounded memory player. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.