Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aoyagi, Masaki
• 署名单位: University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 485-496
• 关键词: Endogenous information; disclosure; Signal quality; TRANSPARENCY; specific investment; strategic ignorance

摘要

A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield mutual benefits but only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by ex ante committing to the quality of his information, and the disclosure rule. We show that even when the acquisition of perfect information is costless, the principal may optimally acquire imperfect information when his own action eliminates the agent's incentive to take action against the risk. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.