Deviations, uncertainty and the core

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Routledge, R. R.
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 286-297
• 关键词: Credible deviations; Agreement formation; cooperative games

摘要

The study of coalition formation under uncertainty poses subtle questions regarding the appropriate definition of the core. In this paper a new core concept, the interim sequential core (ISC), is proposed as a solution concept to transferable utility games with uncertainty when binding agreements cannot be written. This solution concept remedies a problem with the weak sequential core (WSC) of Habis and Herings (2011) but avoids the myopia implicit in the strong sequential core (SSC). The three core notions are shown to be related by the subset inclusion ordering. The solution concept is demonstrated by analyzing the production economies of Shapley and Shubik (1967). (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.