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作者：Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Koch, Alexander K.; Normann, Hans-Theo
作者单位：Universidad del Rosario; University of Mannheim; University of Copenhagen; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Aarhus University; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Max Planck Society
摘要：In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily orig...
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作者：Lafky, Jonathan
作者单位：Lafayette College
摘要：The rapid growth of online retail in the last decade has led to widespread use of consumer-generated ratings. This paper theoretically and experimentally identifies influences that drive consumers to rate products and examines how those factors can create distortions in product ratings. By manipulating payoffs and effectively deactivating either the buyer or seller side of an artificial laboratory market, raters' behavior is decomposed into buyer-centric and seller-centric components. The cost...
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作者：Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas S.
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; Cornell University; Stanford University
摘要：Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how does the Prosper auction do in terms of the borrower's payment, when lenders are strategic agents with private true interest rates? We first analyze the Prosper auction as a game of complete information...
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作者：Gottlieb, Daniel
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times. (C)...
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作者：Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. We introduce two different bargaining mechanisms: tacit and explicit bargaining. In tacit bargaining, an uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to the agent, who then decides whether to accept or reject the offer. In the equilibrium of the game, the principal inefficiently screens out some agent types so that the agent's private informa...
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作者：Barrachina, Alex; Tauman, Yair; Urbano, Amparo
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Reichman University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; University of Valencia; University of Valencia
摘要：We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbent's actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrant's decisions. If the ...
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作者：Franke, Joerg; Kanzow, Christian; Leininger, Wolfgang; Schwartz, Alexandra
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology; University of Wurzburg
摘要：We allow a contest organizer to bias a contest in a discriminatory way; i.e., she can favor specific contestants by designing the contest rule in order to maximize total equilibrium effort (resp. revenue). The two predominant contest regimes are considered, all-pay auctions and lottery contests. For all-pay auctions the optimal bias is derived in closed form: It implies extreme competitive pressure among active contestants and low endogenous participation rates. Moreover, the exclusion princip...
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作者：Herz, Holger; Schunk, Daniel; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：University of Zurich; Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz; University of Lausanne
摘要：Recent field evidence suggests a positive link between overconfidence and innovative activities. In this paper we argue that the connection between overconfidence and innovation is more complex than the previous literature suggests. In particular, we show theoretically and experimentally that different forms of overconfidence may have opposing on innovative activity. While overoptimism is positively associated with innovation, judgmental overconfidence is negatively linked to innovation. Our r...
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作者：Aperjis, Christina; Zeckhauser, Richard J.; Miao, Yali
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Reputations often guide sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider situations where each player is randomly matched with a partner in every period. One player the truster decides whether to trust. If trusted, the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to betray. The strength of temptation, private information to the temptee, varies across encounters. Betrayals are recorded as publicly known black marks. First, we identify equilibria when players only condition on the...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Vera de Serio, Virginia N.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University Nacional Cuyo Mendoza
摘要：We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard. We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability distributions, and disutility of effort, then the agent's utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all levels of income, thus strengthening the sufficiency resul...
