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作者：Adachi, Tsuyoshi
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Penna, Paolo; Ventre, Carmine
作者单位：University of Salerno; University of Teesside
摘要：We present the first general positive result on the construction of collusion-resistant mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can form arbitrary coalitions and exchange compensations (sometimes referred to as transferable utilities or side payments). This is a much stronger solution concept as compared to truthful or even group strategyproof mechanisms, and only impossibility results were known for this type of mechanisms in the classical model. We...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Li, Sherry Xin; Liu, Tracy Xiao; Shih, Margaret
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Tsinghua University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：As the workforce becomes increasingly diverse, motivating individuals from different backgrounds to work together effectively is a major challenge facing organizations. In an experiment conducted at a large public university in the United States, we manipulate the salience of participants' multidimensional natural identities and investigate the effects of identity on coordination and cooperation in a series of minimum-effort and prisoner's dilemma games. By priming a fragmenting (ethnic) ident...
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作者：Kamijo, Y.; Nihonsugi, T.; Takeuchi, A.; Funaki, Y.
作者单位：Kochi University Technology; Ritsumeikan University; Waseda University
摘要：This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater tha...
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作者：Adachi, Tsuyoshi
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：This paper shows that in private value environments, strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are necessary conditions for (full) robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2011). As corollaries, we obtain the equivalence between robust and secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007), the revelation principle for robust implementation, and characterization of double implementation in robust and secure implementation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
作者单位：Kochi University Technology; University of Osaka; University of Osaka
摘要：We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM implements the Pareto-efficient a...
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作者：Okumura, Yasunori
摘要：We consider a pairwise kidney exchange model. Roth et al. (2005) define priority matchings of the model and introduce a mechanism to derive them. In this paper, we re-examine the priority matching. First, we consider a general priority ordering where multiple patients may hold equal priority. We provide a characterization of the priority matchings by using the concept of alternating paths. Using the characterization, we examine the effect of a small change in the priority order on a set of pri...
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作者：Laclau, M.
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for any...
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作者：Kagel, John H.; Lien, Yuanchuan; Milgrom, Paul
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Stanford University
摘要：We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously untested class of value profiles in which synergies arise from shared fixed costs. We find that, in many cases, a simulator that bids straightforwardly does well in predicting auction performance, but exceptions arise because human bidders sometimes rely on cues besides prices to guide their package selection and because they sometimes bid aggressively on items for which they have no value in order ...
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作者：Mathevet, Laurent
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We propose two characteristics of beliefs and study their role in shaping the set of rationalizable strategy profiles in games with incomplete information. The first characteristic, type-sensitivity, is related to how informative a player thinks his type is. The second characteristic, optimism, is related to how favorable a player expects the outcome of the game to be. The paper has two main results: the first result provides an upper bound on the size of the set of rationalizable strategy pro...
