Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bach, Christian W.; Tsakas, Elias
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.017
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 48-59
• 关键词: Nash equilibrium; Pairwise common belief; Pairwise mutual belief; Pairwise action-consistency; rationality; conjectures; Biconnected graph; Epistemic game theory

摘要

We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.