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作者：Linde, Jona; Sonnemans, Joep; Tuinstra, Jan
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Minority games are a stylized description of strategic situations with both coordination and competition. These games are widely studied using either simulations or laboratory experiments. Simulations can show the dynamics of aggregate behavior, but the results of such simulations depend on the type of strategies used. So far experiments provided little guidance on the type of strategies people use because the set of possible strategies is very large. We therefore use a multi-round strategy me...
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作者：Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David; Porteiro, Nicolas
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Pablo de Olavide
摘要：We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is revealed during the relationship. The market dictates the trade-off between sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire high-ab...
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作者：Gratton, Gabriele
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates. We explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters' optimal policy. The model is extended to include strategic voting, policy-motivated candidates, imperfectly...
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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：For dynamic games we consider the idea that a player, at every stage of the game, will always believe that his opponents will choose rationally in the future. This is the basis for the concept of common belief in future rationality, which we formalize within an epistemic model. We present an iterative procedure, backward dominance, that proceeds by eliminating strategies from the game, based on strict dominance arguments. We show that the backward dominance procedure selects precisely those st...
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作者：Bavly, Gilad; Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Correlation of players' actions may evolve in the common course of the play of a repeated game with perfect monitoring (online correlation). In this paper we study the concealment of such correlation from a boundedly rational player. We show that strong players, i.e., players whose strategic complexity is less stringently bounded, can orchestrate the online correlation of the actions of weak players, where this correlation is concealed from an opponent of intermediate strength. The feasibility...
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作者：Renault, Jerome; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：A sender wishes to transmit a secret to a receiver through a communication network, where some nodes are controlled by an adversary. We characterize the directed networks for which there exist epsilon-secret and epsilon-strongly secure communication protocols (for all epsilon > 0): if all nodes are obedient the receiver learns the secret with probability at least 1 - epsilon and no information is leaked (secrecy), and this property is maintained under every strategy of the adversary (security)...
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作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Bramoulle, Yann; Deroian, Frederic
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for uniqueness, covering all concave as well as some non-concave best responses. We then study the relationship between position and action and identify situations where a more central agent always plays a highe...
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作者：Coles, Peter; Shorrer, Ran
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants (Roth, 1982), recent studies have presented conditions under which truthful reporting by all agents is close to optimal (Immorlica and Mandian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2011). Our results demonstrate that in large, uniform markets using the Men-Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, each woman's best response to truthful behavior by all other agents is to truncate her list su...
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作者：Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Universidad de Chile
摘要：In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a symmetric mechanism where colleges and students interchange their roles. This mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Brindisi, Francesco; Celen, Bogachan; Hyndman, Kyle
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information. In the equilibrium of a global coordination game, where players choose the timing of their decision, a player who has sufficiently high beliefs about the state of the economy undertakes an investment without delay. This decision (potentially) triggers an investment by the other player whose beliefs would have led to inaction otherwise. Endogenous timing has two distinct effects on c...
