Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kopanyi-Peuker, Anita; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 273-290
• 关键词: Prisoner's dilemma; COOPERATION; Endogenous punishment

摘要

We consider the possibility that cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma is fostered by people's voluntary enhancement of their own vulnerability. The vulnerability of a player determines the effectiveness of possible punishment by the other. In the Gradual mechanism, players may condition their incremental enhancements of their vulnerability on the other's choices. In the Leap mechanism, they unconditionally choose their vulnerability. In our experiment, subjects only learn to cooperate when either one of these mechanisms is allowed. In agreement with theory, subjects aiming for cooperation choose higher vulnerability levels in Gradual than in Leap, which maps into higher mutual cooperation levels. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.