Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Tvede, Mich; Osterdal, Lars Peter
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Newcastle; Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.016
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 98-110
• 关键词: hierarchies; joint ventures; resource allocation; Geometric rules; MIT strategy

摘要

We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue 'bubbles up' in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.