Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chun, Youngsub; Yengin, Duygu
• 署名单位: Seoul National University (SNU); University of Adelaide
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.005
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 462-476
• 关键词: Queueing problem; Queue-efficiency; strategy-proofness; k-Pivotal rules; k-Welfare lower bound; Identical costs lower bound

摘要

We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategy-proofness in the context of the queueing problem. First, we introduce the k-welfare lower bound, which requires that each agent should be guaranteed her utility at the kth queue position with zero transfer. For each k, we show that the k-pivotal rules (Mitra and Mutuswami, 2011) achieve the minimal deficit in each problem among all rules satisfying queue-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and the k-welfare lower bound. Next, we consider the identical costs lower bound, which is a counterpart of the identical preferences lower bound in our context, and show that when there is an odd number of agents, the k-pivotal rules with k = n+1/2 achieve the minimal deficit in each problem among all rules satisfying queue-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and the identical costs lower bound. Our results provide an alternative justification for the k-pivotal rules. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.