Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Seel, Christian; Tsakas, Elias
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.013
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 75-88
• 关键词: Guessing game; Beauty contest; rationalizability

摘要

Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p -)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function of the parameter p, the number of players and the (discrete) set of available guesses to each player. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.