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作者：Ispano, Alessandro
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：An interested party who controls both the acquisition and the transmission of information may find it optimal to disclose her evidence even when it is unfavorable. At the same time, the public does not necessarily make better decisions when there is more disclosure. The model provides a rationale for voluntary adverse announcements such as product recalls and earning warnings and implications for disclosure laws. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sperisen, Benjamin
作者单位：Tulane University
摘要：This paper studies incomplete information games where players observe only a summary statistic of the history, including reputation games as a special case. A recursive characterization of the equilibrium payoff set is derived for the case where time is observable, relating it to a self-generating set of tuples that capture equilibrium behavior and pay offs. With unobservable time, equilibria have a particularly simple interpretation as self generating points. The tools are applied to a produc...
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an n-player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profiles. Randomized regret-based dynamics are known to yield an approximate correlated equilibrium efficiently, namely, in time that is polynomial in the number of players n. Here we show that both randomization and approximation are necessary: no efficient deterministic algorithm can reach even an approximate correlated e...
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作者：Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S subset of N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d((theta) = 0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coalitional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of d(S) across all the coalitions that include the player. Games of thr...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
作者单位：Lund University
摘要：This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions...
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作者：Fonseca, Miguel A.; Peters, Kim
作者单位：University of Exeter; Universidade do Minho; University of Queensland
摘要：The fact that gossip can be inaccurate, intentionally or otherwise, has led to questions over its ability to build cooperation in large societies. We explore the impact of gossip accuracy on trust and trustworthiness in a population playing decentralized, two-player trust games. We observed non-trivial levels of spontaneous inaccuracy in gossip, and there was evidence that this was largely due to gossipers' desire to punish untrustworthy players. Although this endogenous inaccuracy did not adv...
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作者：Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Southampton
摘要：No trade theorems establish that, in various trading environments, investors who share a common prior will not engage in speculation, as long as expected utility, Bayesian updating and full awareness are imposed. We relax the last assumption by allowing for asymmetric unawareness and examine under which conditions speculative behaviour emerges. We find that if common knowledge is assumed (as in the settings of Aumann, 1976 and Milgrom and Stokey, 1982), unawareness cannot generate speculation....
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作者：Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha; Shubik, Martin
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Yale University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：Consider an exchange mechanism which accepts diversified offers of various commodities and then redistributes them. Under some natural conditions of fairness and convenience, such a mechanism admits unique prices, which equalize the value of offers and returns for every individual. Next define the complexity of a mechanism via certain integers tau(ij), pi(ij) and k(i) that represent the time required to exchange i for j, the difficulty in determining the exchange ratio, and the dimension of th...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Van Essen, Matt
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：We study a class of deceptively similar games, which however have different player sets and backward induction (BI) predictions that vary with their cardinality. The game theoretic principles involved are compelling as predictions rely on weaker and less controversial epistemic foundations than needed to justify BI more generally. Are the BI predictions empirically relevant for this class of games? We design and report results from a relevant experiment. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reser...
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作者：Kadam, Sangram V.; Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：Charles River Associates; Harvard University
摘要：We analyze a T-period, two-sided, one-to-one matching market without monetary transfers. Under natural restrictions on agents' preferences, which accommodate switching costs, status-quo bias, and other forms of inter-temporal complementarity, dynamically stable matchings exist. We propose a new ordering of the stable set ensuring that it forms a lattice. We investigate the robustness of dynamically stable matchings with respect to the market's time horizon and frequency of rematching opportuni...
