Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kadam, Sangram V.; Kotowski, Maciej H.
• 署名单位: Charles River Associates; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-20
• 关键词: Two-sided matching; dynamic matching; stable matching; Market-design

摘要

We analyze a T-period, two-sided, one-to-one matching market without monetary transfers. Under natural restrictions on agents' preferences, which accommodate switching costs, status-quo bias, and other forms of inter-temporal complementarity, dynamically stable matchings exist. We propose a new ordering of the stable set ensuring that it forms a lattice. We investigate the robustness of dynamically stable matchings with respect to the market's time horizon and frequency of rematching opportunities. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.