King of the Hill: Giving backward induction its best shot

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dufwenberg, Martin; Van Essen, Matt
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.007
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 125-138
• 关键词: Backward induction; interactive epistemology; Player set cardinality; experiment

摘要

We study a class of deceptively similar games, which however have different player sets and backward induction (BI) predictions that vary with their cardinality. The game theoretic principles involved are compelling as predictions rely on weaker and less controversial epistemic foundations than needed to justify BI more generally. Are the BI predictions empirically relevant for this class of games? We design and report results from a relevant experiment. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.