Bounded memory and incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sperisen, Benjamin
• 署名单位: Tulane University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.004
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 382-400
• 关键词: Bounded memory; incomplete information; reputation; Product choice game

摘要

This paper studies incomplete information games where players observe only a summary statistic of the history, including reputation games as a special case. A recursive characterization of the equilibrium payoff set is derived for the case where time is observable, relating it to a self-generating set of tuples that capture equilibrium behavior and pay offs. With unobservable time, equilibria have a particularly simple interpretation as self generating points. The tools are applied to a product choice game where the firm may be an honest commitment type and consumers have 1-period memory with imperfect monitoring, solving for the worst equilibrium payoff. The recursive algorithm shows that the observable-time game allows lower equilibrium payoffs due to non-stationary behavior. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.