Information acquisition and the value of bad news

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ispano, Alessandro
• 署名单位: CY Cergy Paris Universite
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.013
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 165-173
• 关键词: Persuasion; Adverse disclosure; testing; Disclosure laws

摘要

An interested party who controls both the acquisition and the transmission of information may find it optimal to disclose her evidence even when it is unfavorable. At the same time, the public does not necessarily make better decisions when there is more disclosure. The model provides a rationale for voluntary adverse announcements such as product recalls and earning warnings and implications for disclosure laws. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.