Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
• 署名单位: Lund University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.027
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 41-59
• 关键词: Rationing price equilibrium; (Extended) English Price Sequences; Iterative English Auction Rule

摘要

This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.