-
作者：Tarbush, Bassel
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：I show that in any symmetric Nash equilibrium of Hotelling's pure location game, as the number of firms becomes large, the limiting distribution of market shares converges to a Gamma(2, 2) distribution. Remarkably, this is true regardless of the distribution of consumers. The proof for the invariance of the limiting market share distribution builds on results from the theory of statistical spacings. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Corgnet, Brice; Gomez-Minambres, Joaquin; Hernan-Gonzalez, Roberto
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; emlyon business school; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Lafayette College; Chapman University System; Chapman University; Universite Bourgogne Europe; Burgundy School of Business
摘要：We study a principal-agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents' performance. Agents' performance is higher in the presence of goal setting despite weaker incentives. We develop a principal-agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts combining weak monetary ince...
-
作者：Han, Xiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study the indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer, in which each object is endowed with a weak priority ordering over agents. It is well known that stability is generally not compatible with efficiency. We characterize the priority structures for which a stable and efficient assignment always exists, as well as the priority structures that admit a stable, efficient and (group) strategy-proof rule. While house allocation problems and housing markets are two classic fa...
-
作者：Mathevet, Laurent
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Suppose that, in repeated games, players eventually engage in a pattern of action profiles, which we call a convention. Do some conventions seem more plausible than others? We answer axiomatically based on the principles of stability and efficient simplicity. The main solution says that conventions should be constant repetitions of a static Nash equilibrium, or such that players switch between two Pareto unranked profiles (across which they each change action). In some repeated games, this red...
-
作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A Bayesian agent relies on past observations to learn the structure of a stationary process. We show that the agent's predictions about near-horizon events become arbitrarily close to those he would have made if he knew the long-run empirical frequencies of the process. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：McQuillin, Ben; Sugden, Robert
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：We characterize the Shapley value using (together with standard conditions of efficiency and equal gains in two-player games) a condition of 'undominated merge-externalities'. Similar to the well-known 'balanced contributions' characterization, our characterization corresponds intuitively to 'threat points' present in bargaining. It derives from the observation that all semivalues satisfy 'balanced merge-externalities'. Our characterization is applicable to useful, narrow sub-classes of games ...
-
作者：Pongou, Roland; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
作者单位：University of Ottawa; Harvard University; Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health
摘要：We consider the problem of valuing inputs in a production environment in which input supply is uncertain. Inputs can be workers in a firm, risk factors for a disease, securities in a financial market, or nodes in a networked economy. Each input takes its values from a finite set and uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over this set. First, we provide an axiomatic solution to this problem, uniquely characterizing a valuation scheme called the a priori Shapley value. Second, we ...
-
作者：Talamas, Eduard
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Simple games are abstract representations of voting systems and other group-decision procedures. A stable set-or von Neumann-Morgenstern solution-o f a simple game represents a standard of behavior that satisfies certain internal and external stability properties. Compound simple games are built out of component games, which are, in turn, players of a quotient game. I describe a method to construct fair or symmetry-preserving stable sets of compound simple games from fair stable sets of their ...
-
作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Goltsman, Maria; Mukherjee, Arijit
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Western University (University of Western Ontario); Michigan State University
摘要：We consider a persuasion game where the decision-maker relies on a panel of biased experts. An expert's preference is parameterized by his ideal action, or agenda. Common intuition suggests that more information is revealed if the panel includes experts with opposed agendas, because such experts will undo each other's attempts to conceal unfavorable information. In contrast, we show that recruiting experts with diverse agendas is optimal only if the correlation between the experts' types-i.e.,...
-
作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Ostling, Robert; Wengstrom, Erik
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Stockholm University; Lund University
摘要：This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to rec...
