Games of threats

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.018
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 139-145
• 关键词: Shapley value; Coalitional game

摘要

A game of threats on a finite set of players, N, is a function d that assigns a real number to any coalition, S subset of N, such that d(S) = -d(N\S). A game of threats is not necessarily a coalitional game as it may fail to satisfy the condition d((theta) = 0. We show that analogs of the classic Shapley axioms for coalitional games determine a unique value for games of threats. This value assigns to each player an average of d(S) across all the coalitions that include the player. Games of threats arise naturally in value theory for strategic games, and may have applications in other branches of game theory. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.