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作者：Gee, Laura K.; Schreck, Michael J.
作者单位：Tufts University; Analysis Group Inc.
摘要：A popular fundraising tool is donation matching, where every dollar is matched by a third party. But field experiments find that matching doesn't always increase donations. Individuals may believe that peers will exhaust the matching funds, so their donation isn't pivotal. We develop a theory of how beliefs about peers' donations affect one's likelihood of donation. We test our theory using novel threshold match treatments in field and laboratory experiments. One threshold match treatment more...
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作者：Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo
作者单位：Durham University
摘要：We study the effects of communication content and its interaction with reputation on the choice of transaction partners in markets with moral hazard. We find that buyers' choices of sellers are influenced by prices and reputation information as well as by sellers' messages: buyers prefer sellers who make specific promises. If specific promises are infeasible, buyers prefer sellers whose arguments reduce the social distance. These observations do not depend on the availability of reputation inf...
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作者：Cumbul, Eray; Virag, Gabor
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University; University of Toronto
摘要：In this paper, we characterize the set of pure strategy undominated equilibria in differentiated Bertrand oligopolies with linear demand and constant unit costs when firms may prefer not to produce. When all firms are active, there is a unique equilibrium. However, there is a continuum of non-equivalent Bertrand equilibria on a wide range of parameter values when the number of firms (n) is more than two and n* is an element of [2, n - 1] firms are active. In each such equilibrium, the firms th...
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作者：Han, Lining; Juarez, Ruben
作者单位：Wuhan University; University of Hawaii System
摘要：We provide a framework for the study of the allocation of a divisible resource from a planner to agents via intermediaries. Intermediaries simultaneously post fees for their services, and the planner optimally selects a subset of them to assist in the transmission of the resource. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a perfectly competitive equilibrium in which intermediaries selected by the planner collect no fees. Furthermore, these conditions are necessary and...
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作者：Iskakov, M.; Iskakov, A.; d'Aspremont, C.
作者单位：V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：A non-cooperative solution, the Equilibrium in Secure Strategies (EinSS), is defined as an extension of the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and is meant to solve games where players are cautious, i.e., looking for secure positions and avoiding threats. This concept abstracts and unifies ad hoc solutions already formulated in various applied economic games that have been discussed extensively in the literature. A general existence theorem is provided and then applied to the price-setting g...
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作者：Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：We consider how to assign heterogenous objects to agents and determine their payments. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences over bundles, each consisting of an object and a payment. We focus on the following cases: (i) objects are linearly ranked, and if objects are equally priced, agents prefer a higher-ranked object to a lower-ranked object, or (ii) objects are partitioned into several tiers, and if objects are equally priced, agents prefer an object in...
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作者：Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha; Shubik, Martin
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Yale University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：We consider mechanisms that provide the opportunity to exchange commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij. Given any connected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique G-mechanism that satisfies some natural conditions of fairness and convenience. Next we define time and price complexity for any G-mechanism as (respectively) the time required to exchange i for j, and the information needed to determine the exchange ratio (each for the worst pair ij). If the numb...
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作者：Hou, Dongshuang; Sun, Hao; Sun, Panfei; Driessen, Theo
作者单位：Northwestern Polytechnical University; University of Twente
摘要：The main goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we introduce the so-called airport cost pooling game, which is a generalization of the well-known class of airport game (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977). We determine the Shapley value of this class of game through a decomposition method for this game into unanimity cost games, exploiting the linearity of the Shapley value. Second, we characterize the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game by applying the so-called collective balanced contri...
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作者：Bachi, Benjamin; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Max Planck Society; University of London; University College London
摘要：We analyze a model of two-attribute competition for a decision maker who follows a non-compensatory choice procedure that only responds to ordinal rankings along the two dimensions. The decision maker has an outside option that functions as a default alternative. In the absence of a dominant alternative, the decision maker may stick to the default even if it is dominated capturing the phenomenon of choice procrastination in the presence of difficult choices. We show that the prevalence of diff...
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作者：Miller, Luis; Montero, Maria; Vanberg, Christoph
作者单位：University of Basque Country; University of Nottingham; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous 'disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-than-unanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in d...
