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作者：Yokote, Koji; Kongo, Takumi; Funaki, Yukihiko
作者单位：Waseda University; Fukuoka University
摘要：We introduce a new axiom, which we term the balanced contributions property for equal contributors. This axiom is defined by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property (Myerson, 1980) to two players whose contributions to the grand coalition are the same. We prove that this axiom, together with efficiency and weak covariance, characterizes a new class of solutions, termed the r-egalitarian Shapley values. This class subsumes many variants of the Shapley value, e.g., the...
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作者：Zhao, Jingang
作者单位：University of Saskatchewan
摘要：This paper makes three corrections in the literature by restating three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley: 1) Shapley (1955), not Gillies (1953, 1959), first defined the core solution; 2) Shapley (1956) first defined and studied the noncooperative solution in multiobjective games; and 3) Shapley (1987) revealed a fundamental error in existing noncooperative game theory. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra; Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED)
摘要：Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules incl...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：A natural way to relate the existence theorems of Reny (1999) and Simon and Zame (1990) would be to show the following: Each game with an endogenous sharing rule satisfying the assumptions of Simon and Zame (1990) is such that the payoff correspondence has a measurable selection inducing a normal-form game whose mixed extension satisfies the assumptions in Reny (1999). We present a result showing that this is not so in general, even when the assumptions in Reny (1999) are weakened to those in ...
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作者：Augenblick, Ned; Bodoh-Creed, Aaron
摘要：We model two agents who wish to determine if their types match, but who also desire to reveal as little information as possible to non-matching types. For example, firms considering a merger must determine the merger's profitability, but would prefer to keep their information private if the deal fails. In the model, agents with different traits reveal information to a potential partner to determine if they share the same type, but face a penalty depending on the accuracy of their partner's pos...
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作者：Trudeau, Christian
作者单位：University of Windsor
摘要：We revisit two classic problems: the assignment problem, in which matched pairs of agents create value, and the bankruptcy problem, in which we need to share an endowment among agents with conflicting claims. Since Core Selection constrains us to exactly divide the value created by matched agents, the assignment problem corresponds to multiple two-player bankruptcy problems. From this we obtain equivalence between the Concede and-Divide (Aumann and Maschler. 1985) sharing method for the bankru...
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作者：Houser, Daniel; Schunk, Daniel; Winter, Joachim; Xiao, Erte
作者单位：George Mason University; Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz; University of Munich; Monash University
摘要：We report data from a novel laboratory experiment on economic decisions under persistent temptations. This type of temptation is ubiquitous, as it refers to any temptation that is present until one either gives in or makes a costly commitment decision to have it removed. Subjects in our experiment are repeatedly offered an option with instantaneous benefit that also entails a substantial reduction to overall earnings. We show that this option is tempting in the sense that a substantial fractio...
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作者：Khan, M. Ali; Zhang, Yongchao
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper rehabilitates a program initiated in Aumann (1974) by contributing a result to the theory of finite-player Bayesian games in environments that explicitly include correlated information. An equivalence theorem offers conditions under which the set of mixed-strategy equilibrium payoffs in a classical finite-action game of complete information coincides with the set of objective pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) expected payoffs in an affiliated Bayesian game with type-independent ...
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作者：Britz, Volker
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：In non-cooperative bargaining games in the tradition of Rubinstein, the proposer's bargaining power stems from the prospect of a delay in case of disagreement. Since players are impatient, this delay is costly for everyone. We consider a unanimity bargaining game in which the proposer can strategically choose the length of this delay. We assume that the size of the surplus depends endogenously on the chosen length of the prospective delay. Intuitively, the proposer faces the following trade-of...
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作者：Levine, David K.
