A market design approach to job rotation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yu, Jingsheng; Zhang, Jun
• 署名单位: Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Nanjing Audit University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.002
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 180-192
• 关键词: Job rotation; Coarse priority; Backward-induction Top Trading Cycle; constrained efficiency; strategy-proofness

摘要

Organizations often rotate employees' jobs. This paper proposes a market design approach to organize job rotation. In our model each employee has occupied a position, and if any employee wants to move to another position, the current occupier must leave the position. This requirement is described by a priority structure in which each employee has the lowest priority for his position and others have the equal priority. It is the opposite to the famous housing market priority structure in which every owner has the highest priority for his endowment and others have the equal priority. We adapt Top Trading Cycle to solve our model. Our mechanism is novel in that employees are not allowed to point to their positions during the mechanism and cycles are cleared by backward induction after all of them are generated. Our mechanism is stable, constrained efficient and weakly group strategy-proof. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.