Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schlegel, Jan Christoph; Mamageishvili, Akaki
• 署名单位: City St Georges, University of London; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.009
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 62-81
• 关键词: Matching; Random assignments; Priority-based allocation; constrained efficiency; Pseudo-Market

摘要

We introduce new notions of priority-constrained efficiency and provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a priority-constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.