Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Peng
• 署名单位: East China Normal University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.006
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 565-584
• 关键词: Random assignment; Probabilistic serial rule; Sequentially dichotomous domain; Sd-strategy-proof

摘要

We present a possibility result on the existence of a random assignment rule satisfying sd-strategy-proofness, sd-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. In particular, we introduce a class of preference domains: sequentially dichotomous domains. On any such domain, the probabilistic serial rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) is sd-strategy-proof. Moreover, any sequentially dichotomous domain is maximal for this rule to be sd-strategy-proof. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.