Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Mu'alem, Ahuva
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.014
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 386-405
• 关键词: Incentive compatibility; Private budgets; revenue equivalence; Incremental values; Allocation networks; Multi-item allocation problems

摘要

We study implementability and revenue equivalence for selling mechanisms in a model where a seller has multiple items to allocate, and a buyer has private valuations and private budgets. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for selling mechanisms to be incentive compatible and ex-post budget feasible for the buyer and derive the revenue equivalence principle in the presence of private budgets. Our conditions are based on a novel network approach that exploits the difference between unrestricted incremental values -the minimal value difference between an item assigned to the buyer by the seller and another alternative- and restricted incremental values -the minimal value difference between the assigned item and the alternative when the buyer can actually afford the alternative, given her financial disposition. We derive properties of incentive compatible, budget feasible prices, and illustrate our approach in a multi-item allocation problem with a convex type space. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.