The evolution of monetary equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Norman, Thomas W. L.
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.010
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 233-239
• 关键词: money; Hahn problem; Preference evolution; evolutionary stability; Money in the utility function

摘要

The Hahn problem is that, even if a monetary equilibrium with valued fiat money exists in general equilibrium, a nonmonetary equilibrium with a zero price on money generally also exists; why should we expect the former over the latter? Here, I consider the preferences that will survive repeated trading in an exchange economy where agents compete in biological fitness. With unobservable preferences and positive assortativity in matching, evolutionarily stable preferences implement the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the sum of agents' fitnesses. In a standard Bewley-Townsend model, this implies selection of the monetary over the nonmonetary equilibrium, and also implies the survival of agents with money in the utility function. Trust in fiat money is only a recent development, and even today such faith is hardly universal. (Cass and Shell, 1980) (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.