Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Awaya, Yu; Do, Jihwan
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Wuhan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.007
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 41-59
• 关键词: Equal-pay constraint; Peer-review evaluation; moral hazard; adverse selection

摘要

We study a moral hazard problem for a firm with multiple workers where the firm cannot discriminate among workers' wages-equal-pay constraint - and evaluate workers' performances only through peers-subjective peer evaluation. More precisely, each worker privately chooses an effort level, which generates private signals received by his peers. The firm solicits peer evaluations, which are not verifiable. The wage must be equal across workers ex post. We show that the firm can still provide incentives to put forth effort if (i) the signals are correlated conditional on joint efforts and (ii) higher efforts lead to higher correlation. The proposed wage scheme is optimal within the class of equal-pay contracts, and when workers are symmetric, it is optimal among all wage contracts. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.