Equilibrium non-existence in generalized games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tobias, Aron
• 署名单位: Syracuse University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.012
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 327-337
• 关键词: Generalized games; Nash equilibrium; EXISTENCE

摘要

A generalized game is a strategic situation in which agents' behavior restricts their opponents' available action choices, giving rise to interdependencies in terms of what strategy profiles remain mutually feasible. This paper proposes a novel example of a simple jointly convex generalized game in which the well-known convexity, compactness, continuity, and concavity assumptions are satisfied, but no Nash equilibrium exists. The essence of this contribution lies in answering a question left open by Banks and Duggan (2004): whether the supplemental condition of lower hemicontinuity of feasibility correspondences can be dropped from these authors' equilibrium-existence theorem. It cannot. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.