Dynamic semi-consistency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bade, Sophie
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.04.001
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 117-126
• 关键词: Ambiguity aversion; dynamic consistency; games with incomplete information

摘要

Semi-consistent conditional preferences are inconsistent enough for different ambiguity attitudes to manifest themselves in different behavior and consistent enough for information to be generically valuable. To simultaneously achieve these two desiderata I assume exactly one type of dynamic inconsistency: agents do not update their preferences upon learning independent randomization outcomes. (c) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc.